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Abstract 
  
The Federal Reserve system (the Fed) is the United States monetary policy authority and 
is mandated by Congress to pursue two goals: 1) maximum sustainable output and employment 
and 2) stable prices. Among the actions the Fed can take to achieve these goals is the ability to 
set the target federal funds rate. Simple policy rules that set the level of funds rate in response to 
changes in economic variables have gained attention as a means to more effective monetary 
policy. One of the most researched and cited rules is that proposed by economist John Taylor in 
1993. Taylor’s rule is simple and intuitive, and it was found to be surprisingly accurate during 
the period from 1987 to 1992. However, this analysis is based on impractical assumptions about 
the amount of accurate data available to a policymaker at the moment of his or her decision.  
I explore the differences in policy rules using real-time data – that is, data available to a 
policymaker at the moment of policy decision, versus ex-post data – that is, data that has been 
fully revised and is accepted as the most accurate representation of an economic variable. Within 
this analysis, I also evaluate differences in policy rules between Fed Chairmen. While analysis 
using ex-post data by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) has found statistically significant differences 
in reaction functions between Fed Chairmen, I find that not only does a real-time Taylor rule 
recommend different levels of the federal funds rate than an ex-post Taylor rule, but also Fed 
Chairman is not necessarily a determinant of structural change in policy formation. I conclude 
that monetary policy rules in real-time seem to describe “eras” of economic events and 
recommendations generated within these “eras” do not differ from actual observations as much 
as Taylor found using his rule.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) is the United States’ monetary policy authority. The 
Fed is mandated by Congress to pursue two goals: 1) maximum sustainable output and 
employment and 2) stable prices. The Fed fulfills this dual mandate by setting a target for the 
federal funds rate – that is, the interest rate financial institutions charge one another for overnight 
loans of reserves. Effectively, the fed funds rate is a benchmark for other short-term interest rates 
and broadly influences credit conditions. A “reaction function” is a model that describes how the 
Fed alters monetary policy (i.e., changes the target funds rate) in response to economic 
developments.  
 The reaction function provides a basis for evaluating Fed policy and the effects of other 
policy actions (i.e., fiscal) or economic shocks (i.e., the subprime mortgage crisis), explaining 
patterns in interest rates (i.e., rates in the 1980s versus those seen before 2007), and ultimately 
predicting the Fed’s policy decisions before announced. As such, many economists have 
estimated unique reaction functions. Taylor (1993) estimated a rule that specifies the real federal 
funds rate reacts to two key goal variables – deviations of contemporaneous inflation from a 
target and deviations of real output from its long-run potential level. In this specification, equal 
weights of 0.5 are assigned to the inflation and output gaps, and 2 percent is assumed as the long 
run target for the natural rate of inflation and interest. In another specification, Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998) expand upon Taylor’s rule by using historical data to econometrically 
estimate the actual weights on the inflation and output gap. The pair also calculates historical 
averages for the target interest and inflation rate instead of assuming a constant target of 2 
percent. 
 While these reaction functions differ in exact parameter specification, each uses finalized 
economic data – that is, data that has undergone multiple revisions and is accepted as the most 
accurate representation of a certain variable. This type of data is referred to as ex-post data. 
Taylor’s rule follows the actual federal funds rate closely, and some economists argue for basing 
the target rate on the rule’s prescription instead of discretion. For example, Judd and Trehan 
(1995) show during the Burns period, the funds rate was consistently lower than the rule’s 
recommendation, which is consistent with the overall increase in inflation during the period, and 
confirms the rule with an explicit 2 percent inflation target, might have held inflation to a much 
lower level than the actual policy did.  
 The caveat to these analyses, however, is ex-post data is not representative of the data 
available to the Fed when deciding how to conduct monetary policy. In my specification of the 
Fed’s reaction function, I utilize real-time data to evaluate how the use of sometimes preliminary 
and unrevised data affects previous findings of Taylor-type rules. The difference between the 
recommendations generated using real-time data and ex-post data will provide an analysis of 
how fully revised data can yield misleading descriptions of historical policy. Analysis of the 
deviations will provide a new basis for explaining, evaluating, and perhaps predicting monetary 
policy. Lastly, while the Taylor rule has been found to accurately describe Fed behavior, Taylor 
rule type reaction functions have been shown to differ significantly across Fed Chairmen (Judd 
and Rudebusch 1998). This research has been conducted using ex post data, and my thesis will 
focus on this same topic using real-time data.  
II. Literature Review 
A large amount of economic research is devoted to the evaluation of monetary policy. As 
the amount of research has grown over time, economists have focused analyses on specific facets 
of policy. Consequently, these individual topics have emerged as unique areas of research, and 
the literature within each topic has grown in volume and depth. One of those topics is the 
development of “rules” or formulas telling the Fed how to set monetary policy. An example of 
early research in the area is Friedman’s (1959) proposal that the Fed increase the money supply a 
constant 4 percent each year to eliminate inflation and avoid destabilizing the economy.  
Since Friedman’s proposal, policy rules evolved to permit the Fed to respond to economic 
conditions. For example, McCallum (1988) developed a rule that determined how much money 
growth should change when nominal GDP deviated from its target, Feldstein and Stock (1993) 
proposed a rule that uses the M2 money stock to target the quarterly rate of growth of GDP, Hall 
and Mankiw (1993) suggested three different types of nominal income targeting, and Taylor 
(1993) advised the federal funds respond to changes in inflation and real GDP.  
Taylor designed his rule to recommend the Federal Reserve adjust the federal funds target 
with equal response to deviation of inflation from a target and deviation of real output from a 
target. Taylor found this rule fit actual policy performance during the 1987-1992 period 
surprisingly well. Taylor (2012) additionally determined monetary policy from 1985 to 2003 was 
primarily “rules-based,” and following 2003, policy was primarily “discretion-based.”  
The applicability of Taylor’s rule advanced research devoted exclusively to analyzing the 
historical relationship between the Taylor rule and policy decisions. Orphanides (2003) defined 
both a “narrow” and “broad” interpretation of the Taylor rule to examine Federal Reserve 
policies using Taylor’s classic rule and an adaptation that allowed the use of forecasts in setting 
policy. The research provided evidence that not only has the Fed historically relied on short-term 
interest rates as its primary policy instrument, but policymakers have also exhibited consistency 
in interpreting operational objectives regarding price stability and economic growth. Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998) econometrically estimated individual reaction functions for Fed Chairmen 
Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan and found the Fed’s reaction function has differed by Chairman, 
indicating structural changes in the function over time. This area of research allows economists 
to interpret possible caveats to the rule and to better understand how historical policy decisions 
can guide future policy. 
Because Taylor’s rule relies on the measurement of economic variables, it is also important 
to distinguish the degree of information available to a policymaker at a given time when 
analyzing historical decisions. McCallum (1993) pointed out Taylor’s formulation was not 
“operational” because it required information about current and recent quarter observations that 
the policymaker did not necessarily have at his disposal. Orphanides (1997) adds analysis of 
Taylor’s simple policy rule is based on unrealistic assumptions about the timeliness of data 
availability. Taylor exclusively used ex-post data in his 1993 specification of the rule, or fully 
revised, final estimates of data, which is consequently not representative of the information 
available to a policymaker at the moment of his or her decision. This observation prompted 
analysis of Taylor’s rule using real-time data. Orphanides (1997) reconstructs Taylor’s original 
rule and finds not only do real-time policy recommendations differ widely from those obtained 
with revised published data but also the recommendations did not follow the actual federal funds 
rate nearly as closely as Taylor’s predictions. This research provides a caveat to simply relying 
on rules to evaluate historical policy. It suggests policy rule analysis does not always place the 
proper emphasis on the informational problem associated with it.   
My research aims to further analyze Judd and Rudebusch’s (1998) claims of statistically 
significant differences in reaction functions between Fed Chairmen by using real-time data 
instead of ex-post data. My goal is to first determine if differences in reaction functions between 
Chairmen still exist when accounting for the informal problem. Second, if the reaction functions 
still differ between Chairmen, I use real-time data to econometrically estimate functions for each 
Fed Chairman. From this, I will analyze how differences in functions compare to those found by 
Judd and Rudebusch. Through this analysis, I determine which real-time specification of 
Taylor’s rule describes Fed behavior most accurately by estimating potential output using 3 
different methods (linear, quadratic, and HP filter) and using a range of different inflation and 
interest rate targets. This research effectively combines the ideas that differences in policy 
decisions emerge due to different administrations as well as informational issues. The resulting 
findings will provide further limitations to the evaluation of historical policy by using simple 
policy rules. 
III. Data and Notation 
The data consist of the real-time observations compiled by Croushore and Stark (2001) in 
The Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists. The data set includes data as they existed in the 
middle of each quarter, for vintage dates 1965:Q4 through 2014:Q3. For each vintage, there 
exists a time series of data that begins in 1947:Q1 and extends to one quarter prior to a given 
vintage date. The complete data set includes a large number of economic variables, but my 
research is limited to a subset of those. I use quarterly observations of real GNP or GDP and the 
price index for GNP/GDP. The output variable is GNP in vintages before February 1992 but 
GDP in vintages from February 1992 on.1 In addition to the real-time data, I also use quarterly 
observations of the effective federal funds rate from 1965:Q4 to 2014:Q3. The data is 
summarized in Table 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Croushoure and Stark constructed the data set to be consistent with the “headline” variable, or the variable that is 
listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in the Survey of Current Business and is the focus of the discussion about aggregate 
economic activity 
In the context of the Taylor rule, there is a distinction when using ex-post instead of real-
time data. With ex-post data, contemporaneous values are used for inflation and the output gap. 
With real-time data, the variables are not known contemporaneously, and one-quarter lagged 
values are used. Hence, at vintage date t, policymakers use data measured through time t-1. To 
make this distinction, each real-time variable is defined as Xt-1 in my notation. I add a second 
distinction to allow for flexibility in the analysis. I add t+i to denote the vintage. Accordingly, for 
analysis of the Taylor rule, Xt-1, t+i represents the data available for vintage t as of vintage t+i, 
where i = 0. Further analysis could focus on a given date and set i = 0, 1, 2, 3… to estimate 
different Taylor rules for each vintage t+i after first estimates of the data have been revised. In 
the context of the Taylor rule, the notation signals two changes. The first is that the measure of 
average inflation equals the prior four-quarter average inflation, instead of the contemporaneous 
and prior three quarter average. The second is potential output differs for each vintage date. The 
process of calculating the gap is a two-step process. First, I detrend the data for each vintage date 
from 1947:Q1 through one quarter prior to the given vintage date. Second, I calculate the output 
gap for each time-series observation within each vintage date. I then use the most recent 
observation of the output gap from each vintage date as the measure of the output gap in my 
analysis.  
IV. Empirical Model 
To begin my analysis, I apply Taylor’s (1993) original rule to the real-time data set to 
determine if the rule predicts the federal funds rate in real-time as well as Taylor found it to in 
his ex-post analysis. Taylor suggests a simple rule for monetary policy that sets the level of the 
nominal federal funds rate equal to the rate of inflation plus an “equilibrium” real funds rate plus 
an equally weighted average of two gaps: (1) the four-quarter moving average of actual inflation 
less a target rate, and (2) the percent deviation of real GDP from an estimate of its potential level. 
The following rule is updated with the real-time notation: 
(1) it* = πt-1, t+i + r* + 0.5(πt-1, t+i  – π*) + 0.5(yt-1, t+i) 
Where:  it* = recommended quarterly federal funds rate 
πt-1, t+i = average inflation rate over the prior four quarters (GDP deflator) 
  r* = equilibrium real federal funds rate 
  π* = target inflation rate 
yt-1 t+i = output gap (100∙(real GDP – potential GDP)÷potential GDP)2 
 
Taylor assumed the weights the Fed gives to deviations of inflation and output are both equal to 
0.5 instead of econometrically estimating the equation. He also assumed the equilibrium real 
funds rate and inflation target are both equal to 2 percent. Using these same assumptions, I 
calculate the predicted federal funds rate using the real-time data. A comparison of the actual 
funds rate, Taylor’s predictions, and the real-time predictions are shown in Figure 1. The figure 
shows while Taylor’s predictions follow the actual funds rate closely, the real-time predictions 
differ significantly. In fact, the real-time predictions are consistently lower than both the actual 
funds rate and Taylor’s predictions. This finding establishes the idea either Taylor’s weights on 
the respective gaps or his estimates for target inflation and the equilibrium funds rate do not 
describe the real-time data as well. Accordingly, either adjusting the relative weighting of the 
gaps or increasing the target and/or equilibrium rates will help correct the discrepancy.  
To continue, I choose to econometrically estimate the weights on the inflation and output 
gap. I replace the pre-selected weights in Taylor’s original equation with coefficients λ1 and λ2 as 
shown in equation (2):  
(2) it = πt-1, t+i + r* + λ1(πt-1, t+i – π*) + λ2(yt-1, t+i) + µt 
Where: it  = Observed quarterly federal funds rate 
  λ1 = Weight given to the inflation gap 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Taylor (1993) uses a log linear trend of real GDP from 1984:Q1 to 1992:Q3 as the measure of potential GDP. I use 
a log linear trend from 1965:Q4 to 2014:Q3 to follow the data. 
 λ2 = Weight given to the output gap 
 
I add an error term in this specification to capture deviations from the rule, or in this case, 
deviations from what was actually observed. Again, I assume the inflation target and equilibrium 
real funds rate are equal to 2 percent. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate coefficients 
λ1 and λ2 as 0.069 and 0.231 respectively. The full model is shown in Table 2. Econometric 
estimation shows that in real-time, not only are the inflation and output gap not given equal 
weight, but the output gap is given more than three times the weight of the inflation gap. A 
comparison of the actual federal funds rate, Taylor’s predictions, and the predictions from 
equation (2) are shown in Figure 2. As can be seen from the figure, rates predicted by equation 
(2) follow the actual fed funds rate much more closely than the rates predicted by equation (1).  
Similarly, rates predicted by equation (2) follow Taylor’s predictions more than those predicted 
by equation (1) and Taylor’s original specifications. This finding demonstrates that while a 
predetermined policy rule may follow actual policy closely given ex-post data, the rule does not 
fit as well when using the data available to policymakers in real-time. Although equation (2) 
describes the actual federal funds rate more precisely, the R2 appears low at 0.178. Therefore, the 
use of one equation to describe the entire time period merits further investigation. In all of the 
subsequent analysis, I follow Judd and Rudebusch’s (1998) procedure closely. The authors use a 
Taylor type rule to prove reaction functions differ between Fed Chairmen, so I use the same rule 
to analyze whether Fed Chairman is a significant factor in describing monetary policy in real-
time.  
In Judd and Rudebusch’s (1998) analysis of changes in Fed behavior, the authors note 
central banks appear to adjust interest rates in a gradual fashion. In estimating separate reaction 
functions for Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan, the two specify a Taylor rule in the context of an 
error correction model that allows for interest rate smoothing. Equation (2) is replaced with  
(3) it* = πt-1, t+i + r* + λ1(πt-1, t+i – π*) + λ2(yt-1, t+i) + λ3(yt-2, t+i) 
where it* is the federal funds rate achieved through gradual adjustment and an additional lagged 
gap term is included to allow for the possibility that the Fed responds to revisions of monetary 
policy targets as more data becomes available. The notation used in equation (3) already reflects 
the use of real-time data for my subsequent analysis. The dynamics of adjustment of the actual 
level of the funds rate to it are given by:  
(4) Δit  =  γ(it – it-1*) + ρΔit-1 
Meaning, the change in the funds rate at time t corrects the “error” between last period’s setting 
and the current recommended level (shown by the first term) while maintaining “momentum” 
from last period’s funds rate (shown by the second term). By substituting equation (3) into (4), 
the equation to be estimated is obtained:  
(5) Δit  = γα - γit-1 + γ(1 + λ1)πt-1, t+i + γλ2(yt-1, t+i) + γλ3(yt-2, t+i) + ρΔit-1 + µt 
Where α = r*- λ1π*. Again, equation (5) has already been changed to reflect the use of real-time 
data in my analysis. The authors find statistically different estimates for each of the above 
variables for each of the Fed Chairmen. Thus, they conclude Fed Chairman is a contributing 
factor to the change in Federal Reserve behavior over time. I apply the same methodology to 
real-time data to observe if reaction functions are still statistically different between Chairmen 
and how the differences compare to conclusions found using ex-post data.  
One of the “issues” in estimating Taylor’s rule includes determining r* and π* and 
estimating potential real GDP. As shown in equation (5), estimation cannot determine both the 
equilibrium real funds rate and the inflation target simultaneously. Judd and Rudebusch use 
historical observations to estimate equation (5) under a variety of assumptions. I apply two of 
these methods to the real-time data set. The first method is to set the equilibrium real funds rate 
or the target inflation rate equal to the average rate that prevailed over each individual 
Chairman’s term. The second method is to set the equilibrium real funds rate or the target 
inflation target equal to the average rate that prevailed over the entire sample. When using these 
methods, it is important to note the average levels of inflation over the samples are less plausible 
than the assumptions of the real funds rate given the persistence of inflation. Policymakers may 
“inherit” persistent inflation rates much different from their own target rate, thus skewing sample 
averages. Setting the inflation target equal to average inflation over the entire sample tries to 
combat this possible bias. The calculations are summarized in Table 3. 
 The next issue to consider is estimation of the real output gap. Taylor (1993) uses a log-linear 
method while Judd and Rudebusch (1998) use a structural definition of potential GDP that was 
developed by the Congressional Budget Office. With unrevised data, there is a bias around 
business cycle turning points, thus output gap estimates in real-time are less reliable than 
estimates using ex-post data (Orphanides and van Norden 1999). While Orphanides and van 
Norden (1999) present an extensive examination of output detrending methods using Croushore 
and Stark’s (2001) real-time data set, I choose three for my analysis: (1) A linear trend, (2) a 
quadratic trend, and (3) the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter. Figure 3 displays a comparison of the 
gaps. The Figure shows that the quadratic estimation follows the actual estimate most closely. 
Because of this observation, I present my conclusions regarding the different reaction functions 
of the Fed Chairmen using the quadratic estimate of the output gap. Results using the alternative 
specifications are presented in the appendix.  
V. Results: Reaction Functions 
 My main hypothesis is that taking account of changes in Fed Chairmen in real-time will still 
help account for changes in the Fed’s reaction function. Accordingly, I conduct Chow tests on 
equation (5) for three breaks during the 1970:Q1-2014:Q2 period corresponding to the terms of 
Chairmen Burns, Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke. I eliminate Miller from the analysis due to 
his short tenure (1979:Q3 – 1981:Q1), as do Judd and Rudebusch. The null hypothesis of the test 
is no structural change. Thus, a “large” critical F-value will result in rejection of the null and the 
conclusion that significant breaks exist in the data. The test rejects stability for the first two 
breaks (Burns/Volcker and Volcker/Greenspan) at the 95% and 99%, level of confidence 
respectively. However, the null is accepted for the third break (Greenspan/Bernanke). It is 
important to note, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) reject stability at the 0.00% level of significance 
for each of the two breaks they tested (their analysis ended before Bernanke’s tenure). I 
additionally test for a break between the Burns/Greenspan period, the Burns/Bernanke period, 
and the Volcker/Bernanke period. The first two tests reject stability at the 99% and 90%, level of 
confidence respectively, while the third accepts the null. The critical F-values for each of the 
preceding tests as well as the values given changes in the measurement of the output gap are 
shown in Table 4. As Judd and Rudebusch (1998) note, finding significant breaks in the data is 
not necessarily strong evidence in favor of structural change at the Fed as Chairmen change, but 
the Chow tests are an initial step. With this understanding, I still estimate individual reaction 
functions for the Chairmen. To outline the remaining results, I present four exhibits for each of 
the four Fed Chairmen. In them, I estimate the reaction function (equation (5)) for each 
Chairman using OLS and then re-estimate each equation after eliminating the lagged observation 
of the funds rate and the lagged dependent variable. This eliminates the dynamics of adjustment 
from the equation and focuses exclusively on observations of the output and inflation gap. This 
function is represented by equation (3). I also display an analysis of plausible values for the 
equilibrium real funds rate and target inflation during each of the Chairmen’s tenures. Before 
concluding, I also present an alternate reaction functions that describe the Greenspan/Bernanke 
period. My discussion here will first analyze each of the reaction functions estimated and then 
examine the respective calculations of r* and π*.   
a. The Burns Period 
In Regression A, the coefficient on the lagged actual funds rate of -0.03 has an interesting 
impact on the other independent variables. This coefficient is low enough to make the other 
coefficients significantly larger and estimates of target inflation and interest (which will be 
shown in the next section) vary widely. The only significant variable in this equation is the 
output gap, and the weight on the gap is more than double that on the inflation gap. This suggests 
the inflation gap was given relatively low consideration during the Burns period and is similar to 
Judd and Rudebusch’s (1998) finding that the real funds rate appeared to not be adjusted on the 
basis of changes in inflation. The two also find the coefficient on inflation gap is negative, which 
corroborates my findings as well. This observation is most likely the result of Burns’ decision to 
lower the funds rate and address the negative output gap, even as inflation was still increasing. 
The dynamic rule in general seems to be a poor representation of the Burns period given the 
coefficients estimated for the lagged funds rate and the lagged dependent variable. Both are 
statistically insignificant and less than 0.1, suggesting Burns did not focus monetary policy on 
changes in the rate.  
Regression B, the stationary rule, does in fact describe the Burns period with more 
plausible estimates. Each of the economic variables is statistically significant in determining the 
actual funds rate. The weight on the output gap of -0.62 is still larger and now more than three 
times that on the inflation gap. Still, although both estimates are statistically significant, it 
appears that in real-time the output gap is given more consideration when determining both 
changes and levels of the funds rate.  
Graph (1b) shows that the actual change in the funds rate follows the general movement 
that is predicted by Regression A, but the actual change is more volatile. For example, in the 
early 1970’s Burns made sharp adjustments to the rate that diverge from the more gradual 
transitions suggested by the rule. This is not surprising given the low magnitudes on the lagged 
variables in Regression A. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) do not find relatively low magnitudes for 
these coefficients in their analysis, thus this finding seems to be unique to the real-time data set. 
This could be the result of either Burns using forecast estimates of these variables that more 
closely resemble the ex-post data, which is very likely, or responding to other variables. Burns 
was vocal about supporting policy that the Fed should act to try and maintain an unemployment 
rate of around 4 percent.  
Graph (1c) depicts the actual and rule predicted rates instead of the changes in the rate. 
Again, the actual rate follows the general movement of the predicted rate closely, however the 
predicted rate is noticeably lower from the early to mid 1970’s. Due to the 1973 oil crisis, gas 
prices and inflation rose quickly. As can be seen in the graph, average real-time inflation reached 
a peak of 12% in late 1974. Additionally, as inflation rose, the output gap became more negative. 
Thus, the graph shows the FOMC raised the federal funds rate through the first half of the 1970’s 
to combat quickly rising inflation, but sharply lowered rates (even before inflation exhibited a 
decline) in order to address the magnitude of the negative output gap. During this period, the 
federal funds rate both increased and decreased rapidly as information became available on the 
rising inflation rate and the declining output gap. This phenomenon has been described as “stop-
go” monetary policy (Gavin and Cooke 2014) and was a reason for loss of credibility in the Fed 
pre-1980. When inflation rose, the FOMC reacted by raising the fed funds rate high enough to 
slow inflation, but when higher interest rates lowered aggregate spending and output, the FOMC 
lowered the fed funds rate sharply to stimulate growth. This narrative suggests Burns favored 
setting and achieving a target rate instead of changes in the rate, and that Regression B is a more 
accurate descriptor of policy during this period. Near the end of Burns term, the predicted rate 
was consistently above the actual. This alludes to Volcker’s task as Chairman to keep funds 
targets high for long enough to control persistent inflation.  
b. The Volcker Period 
Regression results for the Volcker period are shown in Exhibit 2. In Regression A, all 
coefficients are significant except for that on the lagged dependent variable and that on the 
constant. The coefficients on the inflation gap and the output gap are 1.47 and 3.83 respectively. 
The coefficient on the output gap is more than double that on the inflation gap, suggesting more 
consideration is given to the output gap relative to the inflation gap in real-time. Although this 
observation is not consistent with Taylor’s suggested weights (λ1= λ2=0.5), the regression does 
support the idea that both inflation and output are given consideration relative to a target. The 
coefficient on each of the gaps is highly significant, suggesting deviations of these variables 
from a target were important considerations in changing the funds rate target. In the Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998) analysis, the two find fairly similar magnitudes and differing signs for the 
coefficients estimated on the output gap and lagged output gap (2.40 and -2.04). Given this 
finding, the two note Volcker adjusted the federal funds rate based on the growth rate of real 
GDP instead of the level of real GDP. My analysis does not lead to the same conclusion. The 
respective coefficients are 3.83 and -2.68, which are not as similar in magnitude as those found 
by Judd and Rudebusch. Thus, my analysis so far supports the finding that while relationships 
between different variables (i.e., inflation and output) may be similar using real-time data, 
relationships between lagged observations of the same variable (i.e., the output gap and the 
lagged output gap) are not necessarily similar. This is an important first difference to note 
between analysis of historical policy using ex-post data and that using real-time data.  
In Regression B, all coefficients, excluding the lagged output gap, are statistically 
significant. The coefficient on the inflation gap is 0.44 (virtually the same as Taylor’s 
suggestion), but that on the output gap is 0.81, which is still about double that on the inflation 
gap. Although both regressions support differing weights on the inflation and output gap, the 
elimination of the lagged variables causes the weights on the gaps to become closer to Taylor’s 
estimate. This finding is also observed in the Burns period. Thus, the analysis preliminary 
concludes that the non-dynamic Taylor rule results in findings more consistent with Taylor’s 
original rule (1993) even when using real-time data. However, the question of whether a 
dynamic rule or stationary rule more accurately describes Fed behavior is still uncertain.  
As seen in the Burns period, the actual change follows the general movement of the 
predicted change well in graph (2b). The changes prior to 1983 relative to those after 1983 are 
more abrupt. This is consistent with Volcker’s decision to set the funds rate at nearly 20% in the 
early 1980s to lower persistent inflation. Due to the extended duration of high inflation and the 
loss of Fed credibility pre-1980, the FOMC needed to demonstrate commitment to controlling 
inflation, and that is seen in the abrupt and large increase in the rate in 1980. As inflation 
declined around the middle of 1983, it appears the Fed pursued more gradual changes in the rate. 
Due to the extreme inflation, it is likely the Fed would have deviated from any rules prescription 
if it thought the unique circumstance was not defined by a rule. 
Graph (2c) again shows Volcker deviated from the rule’s prescription in the early 1980s 
with a higher funds rate. The line representing four-quarter average inflation in real-time, shows 
Volcker lowered the fed funds rate only after inflation actually exhibited a decline. Judd and 
Rudebusch support this finding stating double-digit inflation was so far above any reasonable 
inflation target that policy did not need to be concerned with judgments about funds rate settings 
provided by a Taylor-type reaction function.  
c. The Greenspan Period 
Greenspan's reaction function is estimated with the most accuracy as measured by the R2 
and adjusted R2. This may be the result of relatively more observations for the period (75 versus 
33 at most for each of the other Chairmen), but it is also consistent with Judd and Rudebusch’s 
(1998) analysis, which was conducted when the amount of available data for each Chairman was 
equal. In Regression A, the coefficient on the inflation gap of 0.75 is relatively low compared to 
those in Regression A from the Burns and Volcker period. While the estimate is relatively close 
to Taylor’s (1993) prediction, the estimate on the output gap of 4.59 is not. Accordingly, 
Taylor’s prediction of equal weights is disproven again. The real-time data suggest more than 
double the weight of the inflation gap is put on the output gap (in fact, more than 6 times here). 
The lagged dependent variable, the lagged funds rate, the output gap, and the lagged output gap 
are all highly significant. This suggests Greenspan closely monitored both data from the current 
and prior periods when setting a new target. The function suggests Greenspan not only attempted 
to correct "errors" from the prior target rate, but also considered the nature of rate transition- that 
is, the effect of changes from one period to the next. This finding may be the result of a 
perceived increase in the need to monitor changes due to the setting of unprecedented, low 
targets during Greenspan's tenure. Due to economic shocks resulting from both the dot com crash 
and the September 11 attacks, the FOMC reduced the funds rate to an all time low of 1.00% by 
2004. Because the reaction of consumers and markets to these rates was somewhat unknown, it 
is likely the FOMC took increased care to ensure smooth rate transitions and monitor and correct 
any unanticipated effects.  
Regression B seems to contradict Regression A because it predicts the weight on the 
inflation gap is higher than that on the output gap. Both coefficients are very close to one (1.08 
and 0.97 respectively) and correspondingly close to one another. This is very different from the 
relationship of the two coefficients in Regression A, so whichever function seems to describe 
Fed behavior better during this period will allude to the true nature of the relationship. From 
Regression A, the significance of the lagged dependent variable suggests the Fed responded to 
changes in the funds rate, so it is likely the relationship between the weights is more similar to 
that found in the Regression A. To analyze this more, I examine the graphs for each equation.  
In graph (3b) the actual change follows the predicted change very well, which makes 
intuitive sense given the accuracy of the equation. While there are periods during which the 
actual change appears sharper than the predicted change, the differences are marginal especially 
when compared to observations from the previous Chairmen’s tenures. There also seems to be 
more changes in the rate during this period. The graph shows relatively more movement 
compared to that observed during the previous two Chairmen’s terms. One possible reason for 
emphasis on incremental change is the low fed funds targets discussed previously. In graph (3c) 
Greenspan’s response to economic shock is shown at the turn of the century, where the funds 
rate exhibits a sharp decline following the dot com crash. The output gap, also shown in graph 
(3c), also exhibited a sharp decline, but inflation remained steady in its fluctuations. These 
observations give support to Regression A for two reasons: 1) measures of economic variables, 
even in real-time, suggested changes in output were more pressing than changes in inflation, thus 
it would make sense to consider the slowing economy more than the barely changing inflation 
rate, and 2) the funds rate was lowered to unprecedented rates, and consumer as well as market 
reaction was unknown. It is likely the FOMC monitored the changes closely for any 
unanticipated effects. Thus far, it appears that in the period following the mid-1980s, also known 
as the Great Moderation, a dynamic Taylor rule is more descriptive of Federal Reserve behavior.  
d. The Bernanke Period 
In Regression A, the only significant term is the lagged dependent variable. Accordingly, 
Bernanke's reaction function is estimated with the least precision as measured by the R2 and 
adjusted R2. Judd and Rudebusch do not perform analysis for Bernanke, given the timing of their 
publication, so there are no findings from the pair to compare with my own. However, the 
finding of low accuracy is consistent with some of Bernanke’s comments. Bernanke has been 
vocal about his opinion on the Taylor rule, and in response to criticism of "overly easy" 
monetary policy in the decade since 2002, Bernanke referenced the Taylor rule in a speech at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. At the meeting in January 2010, 
Bernanke lauded the use of the rule as a guideline but pointed out the rule is subject to a number 
of limitations. One of the most significant is the Taylor rule depends on contemporaneous values 
of inflation and output, while monetary policy works with a lag. As such, Bernanke emphasized 
the use of forecast values of the goal variables in policy decisions instead. Bernanke's apparent 
preference for using the rule only as a guideline is consistent with the low precision of the 
function. Additionally, the significance of the lagged depended variable implies Bernanke 
consistently considered previous observations of the funds rate when setting the rate for the 
current period and utilized the “momentum” from the change in the prior period. As seen in the 
Volcker period, this too may be a function of the historically low federal funds targets during the 
Bernanke period. Following the financial crisis of 2007, the FOMC set the federal funds rate 
target to a range between 0.00% and 0.25%, and it has maintained this target since the first 
announcement at the end of 2008. Again it is likely the FOMC desires to maintain smooth 
transitions toward the unprecedented rate so that changes do not sharply impact consumers 
and/or markets.  
In contrast to Regression A, Regression B is estimated with the most precision of the 
respective reaction functions for the other Chairmen. The coefficient on inflation of -0.52, 
although it is negative, is nearly equal to Taylor’s estimate. However, the weight on the output 
gap is still almost double that on inflation. While Taylor has been vocal about Bernanke’s use of 
discretion versus rules, it appears that in real-time Bernanke’s policy decisions can be 
represented reasonably well by a Taylor-type rule. The function proves that analysis of ex-post 
data can result in misleading descriptions and evaluations of policy decisions. 
Graph (4b) shows the predicted funds change and the actual change are very similar 
following 2010. The change also never exceeds 1% for either measure. This is consistent with 
Bernanke’s tight target range between 0.00% and 0.25% that was in place for a slightly more 
than half his tenure. The range was decided upon in response to the financial crisis in 2007, and 
the immediate response of the Fed to the financial crisis can be seen in the sharp negative change 
in the funds rate following that year. Graph (4c) also depicts the actual decline in the funds rate 
following the 2007 financial crisis and the nearly zero rate that has persisted since 2010. I decide 
to show the quadratic estimate of the output gap in real-time as well as the output gap estimated 
by the CBO to address some possible reasons for keeping the funds rate low amid questions of 
the duration of the rate from some economists. The real-time estimate gives more support for the 
duration than does the actual gap estimate. While the actual estimate starts to become less 
negative at the end of 2009, the real-time estimate has remained relatively constant since it hit a 
low at the end of 2008. Therefore, the decision to keep the funds rate at its near zero level may 
be the result of a lack of information in real-time. This finding again supports the idea that ex-
post data may depict misleading descriptions of historical policy.  
e. The Greenspan/Bernanke Period 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the null for structural change (no change) is 
accepted between the Greenspan and Bernanke period. As such, I perform additional tests for 
structural change between the Burns/Volcker period and the Greenspan/Bernanke period as well 
as between the Volcker period by itself and the Greenspan/Bernanke period. The null is rejected 
at the 99% level of confidence for each test (Exhibit 5, Table (5f)). Because of this finding, 
coupled with the finding of no structural change between the Greenspan and Bernanke period, I 
estimate an additional reaction function to describe the Greenspan/Bernanke period. The results 
from aggregating data in both periods are shown in Exhibit 5. Regression A’s precision falls 
below that of the Greenspan function, but it is still above that of the Bernanke function. In fact, 
the accuracy is closer to the accuracy of Greenspan’s than to that of Bernanke’s. Again, this 
could be attributed to relatively more observations for the Greenspan period. Also similar to the 
Greenspan function is the significance of each variable except for the constant and the inflation 
gap. The coefficients on the output gap, the lagged output gap, and the lagged dependent variable 
are each significant at the 99% level of confidence. This reflects both the conclusion Greenspan 
monitored current and previous period data closely and Bernanke utilized the “momentum” from 
the prior period’s rate change to guide smooth rate transitions. Using real-time data reveals a 
similarity between the two Chairmen in how they emphasized monitoring data from the prior 
period so that the target funds rate would be reached through gradual transition rather than abrupt 
change.  
Regression B eliminates the lagged variables and each of the coefficients falls in magnitude. 
The coefficient on the output gap falls to 0.93, and the coefficient on the inflation gap falls to -
0.66. Regression B also corrects the discrepancy found in Regression B from the Volcker period 
where the weight on the inflation gap became larger than that on the output gap. Analysis of 
combined data from the Greenspan and Bernanke period shows changes in Fed behavior may not 
be the result of different Chairmen, rather different “eras.”  
In graph (5b) it appears almost as if the Greenspan period graph and the Bernanke period 
graph are merged into one. The actual changes still follow the predicted changes closely, and 
there is no noticeable difference between the graphs previously examined. In graph (5c) the 
actual rate and the predicted rate are similar. Taylor (2012) described the period from 1985 to 
2003 as “rules-based” and the period following 2003 as primarily “discretion based. Until 2003, 
the rate follows the rule in real-time closely as well. Following 2003, the same difference 
between the predicted rate and the actual rate that Taylor has drawn attention to is shown. 
Therefore, it appears this deviation from a policy rule could have been due to lack of information 
and not purely discretion as Taylor discerned. Regardless of the discrepancy, the overall 
depiction of behavior from the function for the Greenspan/Bernanke period appears more 
probable than the depiction of behavior from the individual periods. This again supports the 
conclusion that real-time data suggests changes in Fed behavior may be the result of changes in 
“eras” rather than Fed Chairmen. The Greenspan and Bernanke period were both characterized 
by stable inflation but sudden economic shocks (i.e., the dot com bubble or the subprime 
mortgage crisis). Thus, it may be more plausible that Taylor-type rules should evolve to define 
eras that are determined by similarity of economic events rather than a large sample of history or 
even an isolated sample such as individual Chairmen.  
VI. Results: Estimates of r* and π* 
In the remaining discussion of the results, I return to each of the 5 exhibits discussed in the 
previous section to analyze Table (5d) and Graph (5e). The two figures depict plausible estimates 
for the equilibrium real funds rate and the target inflation rate that correspond to the time periods 
described by each of the Exhibits. For each Exhibit, I follow the same method as Judd and 
Rudebsuch (1998) and calculate the average inflation rate and the average real funds rate during 
each Chairman’s period as well as during the entire sample to use as estimates of r* and π*. 
Because r* and π* cannot be estimated simultaneously by the regression, I use either the average 
rate of r* or π* just described to calculate corresponding values for the undefined rate.  
a. The Burns Period 
As discussed in the previous results section, calculations for the equilibrium real funds rate 
are skewed by the large coefficients estimated for the constant and the weight on inflation in 
Regression A. The values calculated for the equilibrium funds rate range from -35.97% to 
-14.96%, which are inconsistent with Taylor’s estimate, Judd and Rudebusch’s findings (1998), 
and the findings in any other period in my own analysis. Because of this, I focus analysis of 
values for the equilibrium funds rate and the target inflation rate on Regression B. The full 
results are displayed in Figure (1e). Average inflation during the Burns period was 5.92%, while 
average inflation during the entire sample was 3.69%. In Regression B, those averages 
correspond to equilibrium real funds rate rates of 2.42% and 2.84% respectively, which are close 
to Taylor’s estimates of 2 percent. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate the equilibrium rate as 
0.71%, but they drop the inflation gap and the output gap from their regression, which restricts r* 
to equal the constant.  
The real funds rate during the Burns period and the total sample were 0.58% and 1.90% 
respectively. In Regression B, the inflation targets are calculated as 15.68% and 8.69%. These 
are clearly higher than Taylor’s estimate of 2 percent, and even if r* is assumed to equal 2 
percent, this rate corresponds to an inflation rate of about 6 percent. Most economists would 
agree 6 percent is not a reasonable estimate for a target either, but due to the persistent inflation 
during the Burns period, it is possible the rule considered this an implicit target. Also interesting 
to note is the inverse relationship between r* and π*. This relationship is seen in observations of 
average inflation and average interest rate over the Burns period. The average rate is very low at 
0.58%, but the average inflation rate is 5.92%. High inflation accompanied by low growth seems 
to explain this finding, but it is clear estimating these variables in real-time is difficult.   
b. The Volcker Period 
Results for the Volcker period are shown in Figure (2e). During the Volcker period, the 
substitution rate between the equilibrium real funds rate and the target inflation rate is lower for 
Regression B than for Regression A. Average inflation during the Volcker period was 5.99% 
which corresponds to an equilibrium real funds rate of 7.15% in Regression A and 5.44% in 
Regression B. These are both considerably higher than Taylor’s estimate of 2 percent, but this 
reflects higher than average inflation that persisted during the period. Judd and Rudebusch find a 
target rate of 3.80% given end of sample inflation equal to 3.07% and note the initial tightening 
of monetary policy could justify higher than expected targets. Given sample average inflation, 
estimates for r* range from 3.78% to 4.44%. 
The average real funds rate during the Volcker period was 4.44%, which produces a range of 
target inflation estimates from 3.70% to 4.14%. Judd and Rudebusch find a range from -0.1% to 
6.4%, and again note higher than expected targets can be justified by the tightening of policy. 
Alternatively, using the average real funds rate from the entire sample finds a range from -2.08% 
to 2.42%. This analysis still shows that calculations of these variables using a policy rule are 
skewed by events that occurred in the period of interest. This is not unique to the real-time data, 
but it does appear results using real-time data are more responsive to changes in the specification 
of the rule (i.e., dynamic versus stationary).  
c. The Greenspan Period 
During the Greenspan period, the relationship between target inflation and the equilibrium 
funds rate is less steep in Regression A than in Regression B. The relationship is displayed in 
Figure (3e). Average inflation during the Greenspan period was 2.43%, corresponding to 
equilibrium real funds rates of 0.61% in Regression A and 0.90% in Regression B. Total sample 
average inflation corresponds to a rate of 1.56% in Regression A and 2.27% in Regression B, 
which are closer to Taylor’s estimates of 2 percent. Judd and Rudebusch find a range between 
1.8% and 2.8%, which is also similar to the range calculated using sample average inflation. 
Thus, sample inflation seems to better estimate plausible values for the equilibrium funds rate 
during this period.  
The average real funds rate during the Greenspan period was 2.33%, which corresponds to 
target inflation rates of 3.74% and 4.72% in Regression A and B respectively. This is not 
consistent with the average seen during the period or Taylor’s 2 percent estimate. Instead, this 
result is caused by the relatively low coefficient on inflation from Regression A and the 
relatively high constant in Regression B. It appears the lack of volatility in inflation during the 
Greenspan period skews calculations of the target rate. The real-time reaction function seems to 
interpret the lack of volatility as a lack of an explicit target. Judd and Rudebusch still find a 
range between 1.8% and 2.8% for target inflation, which suggests calculations of target inflation 
using the real-time rule, is skewed by some factor.   
d. The Bernanke Period 
During the Bernanke period, there is an inverse relationship between the equilibrium real 
funds rate and the target inflation rate, which is seen in the Burns period as well. However, 
Regression A displays a relationship that is less steep than that of Regression A from the Burns 
period. The relationship is shown in Figure (4e). Average inflation during the Bernanke period 
was 1.96%, corresponding to equilibrium funds rates of 0.63% in Regression A and 1.47% in 
Regression B. 1.47% is fairly close to Taylor’s estimate, but 0.68% is closer to the average seen 
during the Bernanke period. 
The average real funds rate was equal to -0.56%, corresponding to target inflation rates of 
5.55% in Regression A and 5.87% in Regression B. This is inconsistent with the average from 
the Bernanke period as well as Taylor’s estimate. It is also the result of relatively low estimates 
for the coefficient on the inflation gap in both regressions. This finding coupled with the same 
from the Greenspan period suggests that the low magnitude of the coefficient on the gap is in 
fact the result of low volatility in inflation. Additionally, this lack of volatility makes it difficult 
for a rule to predict a target in real-time. Furthermore, Bernanke has been vocal about an explicit 
target of 2 percent during his tenure, so the skewed calculations during the Bernanke and 
Greenspan period are most likely not the result of a lack of target. Calculations for target 
inflation using the sample average real funds rate correspond to -1.89% in Regression A and 
1.12% in Regression B. These values are closer to Bernanke’s target and suggest the Fed selects 
targets relative to long run economic performance rather than recent performance. This is not 
surprising given the Fed’s emphasis on long-run economic stability over short-run gains.  
e. The Greenspan/Bernanke Period 
Finally, in the Greenspan/Bernanke period, Regression A is less steep than Regression B 
and is positive as during the Greenspan period. The relationship is shown in Figure (5e). The 
average real funds rate over this sample was 1.45%, which corresponds to a range of target 
inflation from 2.51% to 5.49%. This range is larger than those estimated during the individual 
periods, but the low end of the range reflects an estimate more in line with Taylor’s estimate, 
Judd and Rudebusch’s estimate, and Bernanke’s verbal commitment.  
Average inflation during the period was 2.28%, which corresponds to an equilibrium real 
funds rate of 0.76% in Regression A and 1.29% in Regression B. This is less than Taylor’s 
estimate, but it is close to what was observed during the period. The equilibrium funds rate 
calculated from sample average inflation is even closer to the 2 percent estimate (1.06% in 
Regression A and 2.23% in Regression B). This again supports the idea the Fed chooses inflation 
targets based on long-run performance, and the targets remain relatively unchanged over time. 
Interesting to note, however, is that target inflation calculated using the average real funds rate 
from the entire sample of Chairmen is still higher than expected (3.20% in Regression A and 
7.63% in Regression B). This in turn suggests the equilibrium real funds rate changes over time. 
This conclusion gives further support to the idea policy rules may define “eras” rather than an 
individual Chairman’s tenure or even a long span of history. Rules that consider targets within a 
short period will be skewed by the events unique to that time. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
While the use of policy rules as a means to more effective monetary policy has been 
supported by many economists, it is apparent the lack of information available to a policymaker 
in real-time distorts the applicability of these rules. In the context of the Taylor rule, I conclude 
the rule does not describe Fed behavior in real-time nearly as well as it does using ex-post data, 
and as a result, analysis using the rule results in misleading descriptions of historical policy and 
suggestions of how monetary policy “should” have been conducted. My analysis finds that while 
relationships between different variables remain similar in real-time (i.e., the inflation gap and 
output gap), relationships between different observations of the same variable (i.e., the output 
gap and lagged output gap) differ. This difference results from the lack of accurate information 
available in real-time. It appears revisions in data are significant enough to impact these 
relationships and consequently recommendations in real-time versus those generated using ex-
post data. Additionally, while Judd and Rudebsuch’s analysis finds that reaction functions differ 
significantly between Fed Chairmen, my analysis finds reaction functions differ between 
economic “eras” instead. It is clear that Fed action from the mid-1980s onward (during the 
period also known as the Great Moderation) is similar despite changes in Fed Chairman. 
Furthermore, Fed action before this era is found to be significantly different.  
Lastly, do the rules estimated using real-time data have the power to predict Fed policy 
before it is enacted? Using those estimated from my analysis, no. There does not seem to be a 
strict pattern that the rules follow between eras. However, further analysis can be conducted to 
determine how an estimated Taylor rule changes as revisions of estimates are released. For 
example, further research can estimate a policy rule for a given date at each vintage date 
following the first release of the data. This will serve to determine how policy recommendations 
change as more accurate information becomes available. This analysis combined with that 
similar to my own will provide an even more accurate basis from which to describe, evaluate, 
and possibly predict Federal Reserve policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Supporting Tables, Figures, and Exhibits for Text 
Table 1 	  
  
Number of 
Observations Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Actual Federal Funds 
Rate 195 0.1% 17.8% 5.7% 3.7% 
Growth Rate of Real 
GNP/GDP (Annual) 195 -3.5% 14.5% 2.3% 2.4% 
Inflation Rate (Annual) 195 0.4% 11.8% 3.7% 2.4% 
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Table 2 	  
Variable   Coefficient 	  	  
	    Constant 
 
.010*** (.003)  
 
Inflation Gap 
 
.069 (.073)  
 
Output Gap   .231*** (.037)  
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
   Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
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  Long Sample Burns Volcker Greenspan Bernanke 
  (65:Q4-14:Q2) (70:Q1-78:Q1) (79:Q3-87:Q2) (87:Q3-06:Q1) (06:Q2-14:Q2) 
Average real 
interest rate  1.90% 0.58% 4.44% 2.33% -0.56% 
Average inflation  3.69% 5.92% 5.99% 2.43% 1.96% 
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Table 4 
 
Terms   Critical F-value   
 Consecutive 
Burns/Volcker 
   Linear 
 
4.38*** 
  Quadratic 3.07** 
  HP Filter 5.17*** 
  Volcker/Greenspan 
   Linear 
 
9.09*** 
  Quadratic 5.56*** 
  HP Filter 10.08*** 
  Greenspan/Bernanke 
   Linear 
 
1.13 
  Quadratic 0.93 
  HP Filter 1.88* 
  Non-
Consecutive 
    Burns/Greenspan 
   Linear 
 
3.46*** 
  Quadratic 4.03*** 
  HP Filter 0.75 
  Burns/Bernanke 
   Linear 
 
1.57 
  Quadratic 1.96* 
  HP Filter 0.50 
  Volcker/Bernanke 
   Linear 
 
1.96* 
  Quadratic 1.82 
  HP Filter 3.79***   
 Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1 
Regression Results for Burns Period,  
1970:Q1-1978:Q1 
 
(1a) 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 19.89 -0.03 -9.43 -21.75** 7.77 -0.08 0.46 0.36 
 
(1.10) (0.16) (0.20) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24) 
  B 3.54*** - -0.19*** -0.62** 1.44*** - 0.54 0.50 
	  	   (1.20) - (0.28) (0.27) (0.25) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
 
 
(1b) 
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(1d) 
 
Burns   
Variable 
Calculated A B 
Average π 5.92% r* -35.97% 2.42% 
Average r 0.58% π* 2.05% 15.68% 
Total Sample 
Variable 
Calculated A B 
Average π 3.69% r* -14.96% 2.84% 
Average r 1.90% π* 1.91% 8.69% 
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Exhibit 2 
Regression Results for Volcker Period, 
1979:Q3 – 1987:Q2 
 
(2a) 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -1.66 0.35* 1.47*** 3.83*** -2.68** -0.09 0.54 0.45 
 
(1.39) (0.19) (0.19) (0.43) (0.36) (0.20) 
  B 2.81*** - 0.44*** 0.81** -0.48 - 0.78 0.76 
	  	   (0.90) - (0.17) (0.41) (0.37) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
(2b) 
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(2d) 
 
Volcker   
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 5.99% r* 7.15% 5.44% 
Average r 4.44% π* 4.14% 3.70% 
Total Sample   
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 3.69% r* 3.78% 4.44% 
Average r 1.90% π* 2.42% -2.08% 
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Exhibit 3 
Regression Results for Greenspan Period, 
1987:Q3 – 2006:Q1 
 
(3a) 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -1.22 0.07** 0.75 4.59*** -4.05*** 0.63*** 0.59 0.56 
 
(0.15) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
  B -1.72*** - 1.08*** 0.97** -0.24 - 0.64 0.63 
	  	   (0.62) - (0.21) (0.38) (0.39) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
(3b) 
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(3d) 
 
Greenspan   
Variable 
Calculated  A B 
Average π 2.43% r* 0.61% 0.90% 
Average r 2.33% π* 4.72% 3.74% 
Total Sample   
Variable 
Calculated  A B 
Average π 3.69% r* 1.56% 2.27% 
Average r 1.90% π* 4.15% 3.35% 
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Exhibit 4 
Regression Results for Bernanke Period, 
2006:Q2 – 2014:Q2 
 
(4a) 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 1.27 0.17 -0.33 1.36 -0.94 0.45** 0.42 0.31 
 
(0.52) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) 
  B 2.48*** - -0.52** 1.00*** -0.41** - 0.93 0.93 
	  	   (0.62) - (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
(4b) 
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(4d) 
 
Bernanke   
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 1.96% r* 0.63% 1.47% 
Average r -0.56% π* 5.55% 5.87% 
Total Sample   
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 3.69% r* 0.05% 0.57% 
Average r 1.90% π* -1.89% 1.12% 
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Exhibit 5 
Regression Results for Greenspan/Bernanke Period, 
1987:Q3 – 2014:Q2  
 
(5a) 
 
  α ϒ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R
2 Adj. R2 
A 0.27 0.06** 0.21 3.67*** -3.24*** 0.59*** 0.53 0.51 
 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
  B -0.22 - 0.66*** 0.93*** -0.45** - 0.78 0.77 
	  	   (0.38) - (0.16) (0.26) (0.27) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
(5b) 
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(5d) 
 
Greenspan/Bernanke   
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 2.28% r* 0.76% 1.29% 
Average r 1.45% π* 5.49% 2.51% 
Total Sample 
Variable 
Calculated  A  B 
Average π 3.69% r* 1.06% 2.23% 
Average r 1.90% π* 7.63% 3.20% 
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Chow Tests for Structural Change 
Terms   Critical F-value 
Burns-Volcker/Greenspan-
Bernanke 8.04*** 
 Volcker/Greenspan-Bernanke 9.66*** 
 Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5f) 
 
Terms   Critical F-value   
Burns-Volcker/Greenspan-Bernanke 8.04*** 
	  Volcker/Greenspan-Bernanke 9.66*** 
	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Alternate Reaction Functions  
 
Linear Estimation of the Output Gap: 
 
Burns Period  
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -0.64 0.30 0.96** 1.62** 0.11 0.17 0.48 0.38 
 
(1.02) (0.20) (0.30) (0.28) (0.34) (0.19) 
  B 0.57 - 0.48*** 0.14 1.05*** - 0.74 0.72 
	  	   (1.12) - (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Volcker Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 7.26** 0.39** 0.68*** 3.22*** -2.17** -0.08 0.57 0.49 
 
(1.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.38) (0.34) (0.19) 
  B 5.67 - 0.24*** 0.80*** -0.42** - 0.80 0.78 
	  	   (1.13) - (0.13) (0.38) (0.37) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Greenspan Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 2.81 0.04** 0.46 7.84*** -7.67*** 0.65*** 0.59 0.56 
 
(0.14) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
  B 2.11** - 0.58** 0.75 -0.55 - 0.38 0.36 
	  	   (0.73) - (0.26) (0.55) (0.55) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bernanke Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 3.52 0.18 -0.26 1.36 -1.04 0.48** 0.42 0.31 
 
(0.84) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) 
  B 4.96*** - -0.32*** 1.11*** -0.68*** - 0.92 0.92 
	  	   (0.90) - (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Greenspan/Bernanke Period  
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 3.82 0.04** -0.02 6.06*** -5.81*** 0.59*** 0.52 0.50 
 
(0.13) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
  B 2.34 - 0.67*** 1.19*** -0.88** - 0.65 0.64 
	  	   (0.62) - (0.20) (0.36) (0.37) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
HP Filter Estimation of the Output Gap: 
 
Burns Period  
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 3.55 -0.10 -0.44 -4.68 2.60 0.06 0.37 0.26 
 
(1.49) (0.21) (0.12) (0.32) (0.29) (0.27) 
  B 6.22*** - -0.94 -1.10*** 1.30*** - 0.41 0.35 
	  	   (1.24) - (0.21) (0.25) (0.33) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Volcker Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A 1.06 0.74*** 0.63*** 0.88*** 0.00 0.18 0.53 0.44 
 
(1.13) (0.17) (0.26) (0.29) (0.34) (0.16) 
  B 1.08 - 0.63*** 0.70** 0.23 - 0.84 0.82 
	  	   (0.93) - (0.15) (0.29) (0.33) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
 
Greenspan Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -3.58 0.03 1.85 7.10** -1.31 0.48*** 0.61 0.59 
 
(0.13) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
  B 0.50** - 0.73*** -1.00** 2.07*** - 0.47 0.45 
	  	   (0.67) - (0.26) (0.44) (0.52) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Bernanke Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -3.26 0.07 0.78 2.19 -2.11 0.45** 0.40 0.29 
 
(0.27) (0.05) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) 
  B -3.55*** - 1.51*** 0.59 -0.41 - 0.67 0.64 
	  	   (0.71) - (0.34) (0.39) (0.44) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
	   	   	   
Greenspan/Bernanke Period 
 
  α γ λ1 λ2 λ3 ρ R2 Adj. R2 
A -3.20 0.02 0.84 11.79*** -6.81 0.53*** 0.52 0.49 
 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
  B -1.29** - 1.18*** -0.21 1.06** - 0.48 0.46 
	  	   (0.60) - (0.25) (0.40) (0.45) - 	  	   	  	  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
	   	   	   	   	   	  Significant at the ***99%, **95%, *90% level of confidence. 
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